Agenda

- Congressional Requirement
- New Security Environment
- Capabilities-Based Force
- Long Term Goals and Commitments
Congressional Requirement

• Nuclear Posture Review required by U.S. Congress
• Written report from Secretary of Defense
• Review Co-chaired by senior DoD and DOE officials
• Constitutes a fundamental review of U.S. nuclear policy
• Linked to U.S. nuclear force reductions that reflect the changed security environment
Security Environment: Yesterday vs. Today

**Cold War Context**
- Enduring hostility of Soviet Union
- Known ideological, peer opponent
- Prolonged conflict, defined blocs, limited number of contingencies
- Survival stakes

**Implications**
- Emphasis on deterrence
  - Required high confidence
- Reliance on offensive nuclear forces exclusive of other forces
- Nuclear planning reflected continuities
  - Threat-based
  - Some flexibility for a few contingencies
  - Arms levels fixed by elaborate treaties; verification

**New Era Context**
- Multiple potential opponents, sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges
- New relationship with Russia
- Spectrum of contingencies
- Varying and unequal stakes

**Implications**
- Assure, dissuade, deter, defeat
  - Uncertainties of deterrence
- Synergy of nuclear/non-nuclear & offense/defense
- Nuclear planning
  - Capabilities-based
  - Greater flexibility for range of contingencies
  - Unilateral reductions preserve flexibility, transparency
Proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems continues unabated

- 12 nations have nuclear weapons programs
- 28 nations have ballistic missiles
- 13 nations have biological weapons
- 16 nations have chemical weapons
New Environment and the President’s Direction

- Encourage/facilitate Russian cooperation: “new framework”
- Cold War approach to deterrence no longer appropriate
- End relationship with Russia based on MAD
- Deploy the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirements of the U.S., its allies and friends
- Achieve reductions without requirement for Cold War-style treaties
- Develop and field missile defenses more capable than the ABM Treaty permits
- Place greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons
<table>
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<tr>
<th>QDR: Defense Policy Goals</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Assure Allies and Friends</strong></td>
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<td>- Credible non-nuclear and nuclear response options support U.S. commitments</td>
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<td>- Defenses protect security partners and power projection forces</td>
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<td>- Second-to-none nuclear capability assures allies and public</td>
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<td><strong>Dissuade Competitors</strong></td>
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<td>- Diverse portfolio of capabilities denies payoff from competition</td>
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<td>- Non-nuclear strike favors U.S.</td>
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<td>- Infrastructure promises U.S. competitive edge</td>
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<td><strong>Nuclear and non-nuclear options provide tailored deterrent</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Defenses discourage attack by frustrating adversary’s attack plans</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Infrastructure improves U.S. capabilities to counter emerging threats</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Strike systems can neutralize range of enemy targets</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Defenses provide protection if deterrence fails</strong></td>
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## The New Capabilities-Based Force

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<tr>
<th>Traditional Threat-Based Approach</th>
<th>Capabilities-Based Approach</th>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. force size primarily reflected response to a specific threat</td>
<td>Capabilities for multiple contingencies and new threats in a changing environment</td>
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<td>Nuclear offensive emphasis</td>
<td>- Capabilities required are not country-specific</td>
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<td>Some flexibility in planning</td>
<td>- Maintaining capabilities for unexpected and potential threat contingencies are a priority</td>
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<td>Missile defense considered impractical and destabilizing</td>
<td>- Reduce risk to nation as reductions occur</td>
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<td>Includes active defense and non-nuclear capabilities</td>
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<td>- Defenses reduce dependency on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence</td>
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<td>- Non-nuclear strike forces (conventional strike and information operations) reduce dependency on nuclear forces to provide offensive determent</td>
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<td>Effectiveness depends upon command and control, intelligence and adaptive planning</td>
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The New Triad offers a portfolio of capabilities and the flexibility required to address a spectrum of contingencies.
Sizing the Nuclear Force

- A new approach to U.S. nuclear requirements to address the spectrum of immediate and potential contingencies
  - Operationally deployed force for immediate and unexpected contingencies
  - Responsive force for potential contingencies
  - Preplanning is essential for immediate and potential contingencies
- Goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012 to meet requirements of new defense policy goals
  - Force sizing not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia
- Force structure and downloaded warheads preserved for the responsive force
Sustainment of Current Nuclear Forces

- Current force projected to remain until 2020 or longer
  - Average ages of current systems are: MM-III 26 yrs; D-5 SLBMs 9 yrs; B-52 bombers 40 yrs; B-2 bombers 5 yrs; SSBN 10 yrs
  - Life extension programs for all systems
  - Study alternatives for follow-ons

- Fully fund Trident D-5 SLBM life extension program

- Accelerate DOE’s test readiness
  - Last underground nuclear test in 1992
  - No change in Administration’s position on nuclear testing
    - Oppose CTBT ratification
    - Continued adherence to testing moratorium
Building the New Triad

- Non-Nuclear Strike:
  - Improved capabilities against hard and deeply buried targets
  - Conversion of four Trident submarines to carry cruise missiles

- Missile Defense:
  - Robust Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation program
  - Deploy limited and effective missile defenses

- Command and Control, Intelligence, and Planning:
  - Develop secure, wide-band communications between national decision makers, command centers and operational forces
  - Develop advanced technology programs for intelligence, e.g. for Hard and Deeply Buried Targets and mobile targets
  - Upgrade STRATCOM’s capability for adaptive planning
The Journey to Reduction and a New Triad

NOW
START I 6000

2004

Peacekeeper Elimination
4 SSBNs converted
No B-1B rerole Req’t

Near Term
Mid Term
Far Term

Operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads

1,700 - 2,200

New Triad

Fielded Capabilities

- Improved Conventional Strike Capability
- Missile Defenses
- Command, Control, Intelligence and Planning
- Infrastructure

○ = Periodic Assessment Point
NPR Decisions Made

- Reduce operationally deployed warheads to 1700-2200 over the next decade
  - Retire Peacekeeper (MX) ICBMs beginning in calendar year 2002
  - Remove 4 Trident submarines from strategic service
  - Will not retain capability to return B-1 to nuclear role
  - Download warheads from operationally deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
- Planned reductions will be completed in phases
  - By FY 07, reductions to ~ 3800
  - Beyond FY 07, reductions to 1700-2200 will be completed by 2012
Conclusion

- NPR charts the path for the first step in military transformation
- More accurately reflects new security environment
- Replaces dependence on nuclear weapons with synergies between all parts of defense
- Balances near-term risks with longer-term risks