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putnam-philosophy_of_language_and_philosophy_of_science, the distinction btw. beliefs and meaning is central Realism Putnam/Kripke: Reference determines Meaning, reference to experiments is reduced to reference to observables example There is a current flowing in the wire -> the voltmeter's needle is moving, the distinction btw. beliefs and meaning is central with Quine we should therefore say good bye to meaning, reference to experiments is reduced to reference to observables this is similar to psychological behaviourism, ???? this causes dilemma, reference to experiments is reduced to reference to observables Reichenbach's critic this relationship is a probabilistic inference within a theory and has no analytic whatsoever character, meaning of a sci. proposition is to know what would be evidence for that proposition often therefore reference to experiments is reduced to reference to observables, Reference as invariant meaning constituens how is reference determined? intensions, meaning of a sci. proposition is to know what would be evidence for that proposition Putnam's critic if evidence is a function of the total theory then with theory changes we always have meaning changes, the distinction btw. beliefs and meaning is central Realism Reference as invariant meaning constituens