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Kuenne-from_althic_anti_realism_to_althic_realism, alethic anti-realism variants non-definitional: no sense-reductionalism, truth and justification are interdependent notions doesn't necessarily imply Co-extensivity, To think of knowledge as something we never really possess but only 'approximate' is the first step on the slide to scepticism, and my talk of 'idealization' was unfortunate if it suggested such a view. so (s) ex(c) : s -> Just(s,c) but not ex(c) (s) : s -> Just(s,c), Differences: truth and justification that is some truths are inaccessable to verification, this is not a definition (P10a) but truth and justification are interdependent notions, (s) ex(c) : s -> Just(s,c) but not ex(c) (s) : s -> Just(s,c) compare Heisenberg's unsharpness relation, (s) ex(c) : s -> Just(s,c) but not ex(c) (s) : s -> Just(s,c) with Just(s,c) : c justifies s, truth is a kind of rational acceptability so (1981) Truth as an idealization of rational acceptability. We speak as if there were such things as epistemically ideal conditions and we call a statement true if it would be justified under such conditions. (1981), concession to moderate verificationalism: truth can never be totally recognition transcendent follows from that esse est percipi?, (s) ex(c) : s -> Just(s,c) but not ex(c) (s) : s -> Just(s,c) with statement s